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In this article, we analyze the protest movement PEGIDA’s criticism of the press (i. e. 
‘Lügenpresse’, the ‘liar press’) on Facebook. What are the main points of criticism of 
the press and what are the reasons expressed for this criticism, and how do they refer to 
traditional media in the postings? We conduct a qualitative content analysis of 
PEGIDA’s Facebook pages in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway. The study 
shows that there are two main types of references: affirmative references to prove one’s 






The liar press-shouts during the rallies of the right-wing populist movement PEGIDA 
(abbreviation for ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) in 
Germany condense one of the most dominating discourses not only in Germany but also 
in other countries. The question if mainstream media reports accurately and does a full 
coverage including different standpoints, especially concerning political issues, is in the 
middle of this debate. Especially right-wing populist politicians and activists claim that 
established media lies in the coverage of migration politics. Journalists are seen as part 
of the elite, besides the political establishment or other elite persons and organizations 
like international bank houses, and are therefore defined as enemies in populist 
ideology. Populist communication tries to appeal to the ‘pure people’ and to separate 
them from ‘the elite’ and social outgroups such as migrants, long-time unemployed 
people and others (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). The aversion against journalism 












politics: Frauke Petry, a former politician of the German party Alternative for Germany, 
persistently calls established journalism ‘Pinocchio press. Also, physical attacks on 
journalists are reported and condemned by professional organizations (BDZV 2016). In 
Sweden, the Sweden Democrats have for long been treated more negatively by 
journalists than other parties and have successfully been able to use the victimization by 
mainstream media as a rhetorical resource (Hellström and Lodenius 2016).  
PEGIDA’s allegations include critique on the trustworthiness of journalistic 
products as well as on an assumed limitation of political diversity in media coverage. 
Empirical research shows that established journalists are not always used as an enemy 
in populist discourse. In many cases, the populist movement even used mainstream 
media coverage to underline their own political positions (Holt and Haller 2016). 
However, media distrust remains a central category in populist right-wing discourse. 
But how exactly PEGIDA relates to mainstream media has not been investigated yet. 
This paper uses a qualitative content analysis of the PEGIDA Facebook pages of its 
outlets in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway. We analyzed postings from June 1st 
until September 30, 2015 to identify the patterns of media criticism used in the online 
communication of the movement in order to answer our research question (RQ): How 
are references to mainstream media used on the PEGIDA Facebook pages in Germany, 
Austria, Sweden, and Norway?  
 
 
Media distrust, populism, and alternative media 
 
In recent years, Europe has seen the rise of populism as well as various alternative 
media that express anti-system, anti-establishment and anti-immigration sentiments 
(Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Stromback, and De Vreese 2016; Holt 2016). These media 
present alternative interpretations of political and social events and try to influence 
public opinion according to agendas that are mainly critical of immigration politics and 
the perception of an imminent threat of Islamization of European countries – although 
the main focus of criticism and level of ‘anti-systemness’ (Capoccia 2002) varies 
greatly among different outlets. Additionally, the intensity of criticism also varies 
greatly between them, making it difficult to talk about a specific and well-defined new 
type of alternative media. Nevertheless, as in the Swedish case, a number of alternative 
media outlets (especially online) with a specific focus on a) criticism of Swedish 
immigration policy and b) of how this issue is treated in mainstream media have 
become visible enough to attract much attention and cause intense debates within the 
mainstream media (Truedson 2016). These alternative media often accuse traditional 
media of: being biased against any immigration-critical perspective, covering up 
problems related to immigration, and ostracizing individuals who espouse political 
views deemed controversial (Holt 2016). What distinguishes these alternative media 












critique and sometimes even undermine trust in established media. These media outlets 
are not always purely ideological in a traditional sense, although there are many with 
outspoken sympathy for right-wing extremism. Their ideological focus is not, however, 
limited to far-right activism. Those active in these environments represent positions 
along a very wide spectrum – from neo-Nazis and fascists through right wing populists 
to moderates and social democrats (Holt 2016). As an alternative media channel, and 
given the fact that the PEGIDA movement expressly avoids contact with mainstream 
media, the movement’s Facebook pages can be placed within this broader context of 
immigration critical alternative media.  
Since there is a lack of research and knowledge specifically about these media, 
political as well as scholarly debates about such media channels can (and tend to) be 
somewhat crippled by indignation and polemics (Taguieff 2015), rather than based on 
facts and systematic observations. In order to understand why these media are appearing 
in Europe and seem to be successful in their communication, it is necessary to study the 
whole range of political expressions related to immigration-critical perspectives and 
media skepticism, especially in the context of the “new technological affordances 
epitomized by Web 2.0”. (Alvares and Dahlgren 2015). The criticism from these 
alternative media regarding the way that mainstream media works cannot be brushed off 
as a minimal and peripheral phenomenon; they represent perspectives that echo across 
the European political scene as well the American, where President Donald Trump 
employs similar arguments (Trump 2016). Tsfati (2003, p. 67) defines media skepticism 
as a sense of “alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream media”. It involves the 
“feeling that journalists are not fair or objective in their reports about society and that 
they do not always tell the whole story” and that mainstream journalists “will sacrifice 
accuracy and precision for personal and commercial gains” (Tsfati 2003, 67). A recent 
study shows support for the hypothesis that online news-consumption from alternative 
sources through social media negatively affects the level of satisfaction with 
democracy, and the authors refer to interaction with “anti-system” views as an 
explanation (Ceron and Memoli 2015). In this paper, our aim is to study and describe 
this criticism as it is visible through the way PEGIDA relates to mainstream media in 
their Facebook postings, in order to contribute to a better understanding of how media 
criticism is expressed by populist movements on social media.  
Paradoxically, the relationship between populist players and alternative media 
on the one hand, and mainstream media on the other, is not entirely one of contestation 
and antagonism. Populist politicians need the mainstream media both as opposing poles 
in their rhetoric and as vehicles for their message. The connection between these 
movements and the established media is therefore more complex because any 
movement needs publicity (Mazzoleni 2014). Also, recent studies have shown that 
alternative media are highly dependent on mainstream media for material to write about 
and to comment on; in order for there to be an alternative, the original must be in place 
















The strategic communication of the PEGIDA movement almost exclusively takes place 
via Facebook pages as the leaders refuse to talk to established media. For instance, 
PEGIDA Germany does not operate a genuine website. In the beginning of the 
movement, the URL www.pegida.de linked to the Facebook account @pegidaevofficial, 
which is the most important communication platform of the protesters. Since right-wing 
populist movements often express anti-mainstream media resentments that may lead to 
a non-use of traditional PR instruments such as press conferences or news releases, 
political communication research has to focus on optional communication channels 
such as social network sites. 
Since there is less research on manifestations of media distrust and criticism of 
established media by populist social movements, an explorative approach is useful. In a 
recent study (Holt and Haller 2016), we found that PEGIDA pages in different countries 
often refer to news articles of established media in an affirmative fashion, for example 
by pointing out that a mainstream newspaper article states something that strengthens 
their own arguments. However, a closer qualitative research has not yet been made. Our 
approach in this study focuses on a qualitative content analysis of the postings on the 
official Facebook sites of the movement to find out how PEGIDA outlets substantiate 
the ‘liar press’ accusation. Media distrust can be expressed by different allegations. 
Some critiques argue that journalists hide facts that could be considered opportune to a 
right-wing populist agenda, such as hiding crime statistics of migrants. Other 
accusations claim that there is an exclusion of some political camps such as right-wing 
movements, parties or politicians. The most aggressive allegations are that mainstream 
media journalists intentionally lie in terms of presenting wrong information on topics, 
especially concerning migration. The qualitative content analysis focuses on the type of 
media distrust in the postings of the movement. The coding was conducted by using the 
qualitative research software MAXQDA. All posts containing references to traditional 
media, online and offline, were identified and part of the qualitative analysis. 
‘References’ can be differentiated between explicit and implicit references: 
 
1) An explicit mention of traditional media can be identified when media 
companies or journalists are explicitly named, for example: ‘According to 
an article of SPIEGEL Online’ or ‘a journalist from the ARD TV show’. 
Hyperlinks to mainstream media products are also counted as explicit 
references. 
 












named but addressed as a whole, for example as ‘liar press’, ‘the 
mainstream media’, ‘Pinocchio press’, ‘established media’ or ‘journalistic 
elite’. 
 
The four countries we have selected are examples of countries where the emergence of 
a movement like PEGIDA, and their brand of populism, constitutes a sharper contrast to 
the mainstream/elite attitude toward immigration (and Islam in particular) upheld in 
public discourse by influential parties than in many other European countries. This is 
most evident in Germany and Sweden – countries who have differed mostly from most 
European countries in this respect – but it also goes for Austria and Norway to a lesser 
degree (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2016). The self-appointed position as 
outsider, rebel and voice of marginalized opinions is highlighted in such settings and 
motivates the study of how they relate to mainstream media in these countries. Since 
there are also differences between the countries in these matters, a comparison is made 
between them. 
Overall, the sample includes 892 postings (Germany: 351; Austria: 384; 
Sweden: 106; and Norway: 51). After identifying the posts with references to 
mainstream media the sample was reduced to 348 postings (Germany: 151; Austria: 
151; Sweden: 25; and Norway 21). Converted to percentages, 43% of the German, 39% 
of the Austrian, 26% of the Swedish and 41% of the Norwegian sample contain at least 
one reference to mainstream media. After picking out relevant postings with references 
to traditional media and importing them to MAXQDA, we analyzed the objects. The 
research focus was on the actual use of the media references: We investigated how the 
references were used and whether the usage fulfilled a strategic function. It was 
assumed that the PEGIDA pages mainly criticized mainstream media as an opposing 
actor for political reasons. 
Our sample contains all postings of the official PEGIDA Facebook pages from 
June 1st until September 30 in the most intense phase of the refugee crisis of 2015. The 
German sample must be seen as a special case for several reasons: PEGIDA emerged in 
Germany and was topic of international media coverage, especially in 2015 when the 
participant numbers rose up to 20.000-25.000 (Durchgezaehlt.org 2016).1 Besides, the 
German PEGIDA page is by a large margin the most successful page in the sample in 
terms of ‘likes’. In the empirical analysis and particularly in the interpretation of the 
findings it has to be noted that the Scandinavian pages do not have that range (the 
Swedish page had 1.325 ‘likes’ and the Norwegian had 5.143). In July 2016 the German 
page had about 205.000 ‘likes’. A quite impressive number: Chancellor Merkel’s CDU 
(Christian Democratic Union) had about 123.500 ‘likes’ and the SPD (Social 
Democrats) 120.000 in December 2016. The German page was also in the center of a 
                                                
1 Social movements are difficult to analyze as there is no registration process in the most cases. We also 
have different sources counting the numbers of protest marchers. The website Durchgezaehlt.org shows 












conflict between PEGIDA and Facebook. After complaints of users the original page 





In this chapter we will present the qualitative findings of the study. Each subchapter will 
first describe an overall theoretical consolidation. In a second step examples from each 
investigated country will illustrate the theoretical assumptions. Actually, the study 
identified the assumed ‘liar press’ accusation by the right-wing populists. Nevertheless, 
we found another communicative pattern regarding media references, namely 
affirmative ones. A third type of references was neutral or could not be coded 
unambiguously. For a better transparency and understanding, all selected posts in the 




Contrary to the thesis of a dominance of media criticism or distrust, the qualitative 
analysis revealed an affirmative pattern. These types of references are used to ‘prove’ 
own political standpoints of the page producers. Some articles substantiated PEGIDA’s 
positions, for example by showing statistics on migration or by citing politicians or 




The simplest type of affirmative references are articles to topics including crime caused 
by immigrants or terrorism. On June 26th the German PEGIDA page linked to breaking 
news of the magazine Focus about the Islamic terror attack on a tourist hotel in Tunisia. 
The producers of the page affirmed their fears with the words: “And it goes on, take 
care guys, the sleeper cells can be everywhere!” Another link to the newspaper Die Welt 
from September 3rd was about the Norwegian intelligence warning of ISIS and Al 
Nusra terrorists who could use refugee trails to enter Europe. Affirmative references 
were not only about crime but also contained critique on the refugee policy. There are 
illustrative examples for that: On September 3rd PEGIDA linked to MDR, a German 
public service TV station. It reported about the trade with Syrian passports in Germany. 
A second article underlined that political problem in the newspaper Die Welt. It reported 
about a Dutch journalist who bought a fake Syrian passport with the portrait and the 
personal information of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte. There are 
further references which were used to prove a failed immigration policy in other areas: 












(September 9th). The post is accompanied by the text: “Denmark shuts down…it is 
colorful enough.” In the German right-wing sector the word “colorful” (German: 
“bunt”) is regularly used in a sarcastic way to make fun of (mainly left-wing) people 
demanding a high diversity of cultures in the country. PEGIDA’s criticism also 
concerns concrete political areas, for instance labor market policy. An article of the 
weekly newspaper Die Zeit cited the German Employment Minister, Andrea Nahles 
with the words “The Syrian Doctor is not the usual case.” (September 10th). In the lead 
of the posting the administrators of the page are agitating against asylum seekers. Like 
in many other posts of the German page there is also an insult against Sigmar Gabriel, 
former leader of the Social Democrats (SPD), who is named as 
“#FastSonderSchülerSigmar” in reference to Gabriel’s statement that a former teacher 




Like in the case study of Germany, we also found affirmative references on the Austrian 
page. One type of ‘positive’ references are posts of mainstream media articles citing 
politicians or experts with similar or same political positions to those of PEGIDA. An 
online text of the Austrian quality newspaper Die Presse was posted on July 9th: The 
text cited Heinz-Christian Strache, frontman of the right-wing populist Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ). The text is about the discussion on financial help for Greece. 
Strache demands a referendum of the Austrian people before the government would 
send money to the indebted country. The introductory text of the posting highlights 
Strache’s quote and a part of the article. A second type of affirmative references 
concerns statistics that support PEGIDA’s positions on migration. On September 10th 
the movement uploaded an article of Heute, a large giveaway newspaper in Austria. The 
article shows a statistic on financial family assistance for immigrants: “223 million 
euros flowed abroad in 2014”. The post implicitly assumed that immigration costs 
Austria millions of euros. 
Besides texts which are used to prove one’s own position, we see another type of 
affirmative reference: One posting referred to the newspaper Augsburger Allgemeine 
and was about the plan of PEGIDA Germany to run in the 2016 state elections (regional 
elections) in Germany (July 8th). The article cited one of the most prominent leaders of 
PEGIDA, Lutz Bachmann. In a speech at a rally in the city of Leipzig, he said that 
PEGIDA would try to get direct mandates to overcome the five-percent threshold 
needed to gain seats in the state parliaments (‘Landtage’). That posting shows that 
affirmative references are not only about certain political issues but also concern 
organizational aspects. The communicative purpose could be to show the Austrian 
supporters that the right-wing populist movement has a clear political strategy.  
In three cases the Austrian page posted letters to the editor of mainstream media dealing 












the leading Austrian tabloid Krone in the column ‘The Free Word’ (‘Das Freie Wort’). 
On June 29th a reader criticized the Austrian Minister of the Interior who said that 
terrorism in France and Tunisia would “have no connection to Austria”. The writer 
complains about the wording of Islamic crimes which would be called ‘psychotic’ and 
not as terrorist attacks. The other letters made the asylum crisis a subject of discussion. 
On July 26th a reader wrote about asylum seekers which complained about the 
conditions in the Austrian refugee camp in Traiskirchen: “Therefore my question to all 
of those asylum seekers: Why are you here, more specifically why are you not going 
somewhere else if you do not like the care in Austria?”. The third letter (August 9th) 
built up a conflict between the political class and the people in the asylum discussion: 
“What is happening right now is pure dictatorship and the bill will be presented in the 
end. Look at the opinion polls! Dear guys, you are ruling in the wrong direction against 
us Austrians!”. The use of letters to the editor may be to produce a ‘community feeling’ 
in the right-wing sphere. By showing letters of normal media recipients creates the 
impression that PEGIDA’s claims ‘match up’ with the political standpoints of the 




As shown in a previous study, the Swedish page is more oriented towards 
communication directly with supporters than the other countries, for example with 
information about a planned rally or about the leadership of the movement or with 
direct calls for actions (for example ‘share this post’). Sweden also stands out against 
the other three countries referring to traditional media less frequently (and to alternative 
media more frequently) than the other countries (Holt and Haller 2016). Here we have 
looked more specifically into the nature of the references to traditional media. When it 
comes to the affirmative references, we found that they fall into the same patterns as 
described above with the German and Austrian cases. On the 2 August, 2015, for 
example a posting contained a shared article from the Swedish Public Service TV 
broadcaster (SVT), with a debate article arguing against a proposal for introducing 
separate opening hours for men and women at certain public pools. In this case it is 
clear that the posting of this article is a statement of support for the debater who clearly 
opposed such Islamic influence on Swedish public life. Other postings contained 
articles from traditional media with statements or information that problematizes 
Islamic organizations or pointed to the threat of Islamic terrorism or Swedish 
unpreparedness for crime committed by Muslim immigrants. One post contained a link 
to an article by a local tabloid where the view on women and equality presented on 
various Muslim online resources in Sweden is criticized. Another example is a link to a 
morning newspaper with an article about the police inability to deal with crime in 
certain problematic areas where many immigrants live. One posting was a link to an 












Sweden. The references to traditional media on the Swedish page were almost 




The Norwegian page contained many references with added comments from the one 
who posted. On the 18th of June, for example, the posting contained a reference to an 
article in the business newspaper Finansavisen and an article that compared the cost of 
accepting refugees from Syria into Norway with the cost of sending aid to the region. 
PEGIDA Norway comments: “The cost for one Syrian refugee is 7 million crowns!”. 
Other affirmative postings of links to mainstream media mainly deal with news that are 
presented as support for a critical stance against Islam, like reports about the 
persecution of Christians in Islamic countries or negative effects of immigration for 
Norwegians (such as for example cut downs in the care for the elderly made in order to 





Our first working hypothesis claimed that there will be mostly anti-media postings on 
all PEGIDA pages in the sample. Theoretical works suggest that media criticism is an 
integral part of an anti-elite strategy of populist communication. Actually, there are 




Some contesting references in the German sample used mainstream media content as a 
basis to contest opposing positions. An online article of the private news channel N-TV 
featured an interview with the CEO of Daimler Benz, who said that “most of the 
refugees are young, well-educated and highly motivated. Precisely the type of people 
we are looking for.” (September 6th). PEGIDA then called him a hypocrite as Daimler 
would not build any factories in Africa which would stop emigration from the continent. 
Another post linked to an article of the Sächsische Zeitung and was about rumors that 
asylum seekers would be allowed to steal in supermarkets. The producers of the 
Facebook page commented on that and claimed that the newspaper was owned by the 
Social Democratic Party: “Really a great and calming journalistic investigation” 
followed by laughing emoticons. It is obvious that PEGIDA questioned the 
trustworthiness of the report. This example shows that the right-wing group tries to 
build up a political-medial complex which can also be observed on a macro level (see 












by left-wing extremist in Leipzig a scientist said in the newspaper Freie Presse that 
more policemen could “heat up the atmosphere” at demonstrations. In that case 
PEGIDA also uses a sarcastic reply: “Consequently less police would mean that the 
SAntifa picks up little flowers, we understood Professor Pickel…”. Like in other cases 
PEGIDA creates a compound word: ‘SAntifa’, which contains ‘Antifa’ as the 
abbreviation for anti-fascist movements and ‘SA’ which stands for the Sturmabteilung, 
a paramilitary group in the Third Reich. Once again, a separation into ‘the people’ and a 
social outgroup, the anti-fascists, is made including criticism of the elite personalized by 
a scientist was made. 
In addition to attacks against specific media outlets there are posts expressing 
critique to established media in general. It is striking that the German page often uses 
the word ‘liar press’ to label mainstream media as untrustworthy information sources 
(for example on September 3rd, 4th, 11th, 14th, 16th or 18th). The liar press allegation 
is often accompanied by insults such as the word ‘#Journaille’ which is a degrading 
German term for journalism. On September 19th PEGIDA wrote: “The following 
applies for every #journaille of that kind, you have to hit the #presstitutes where it hurts 
the most.”. ‘Presstitutes’ is a compound word of ‘press’ and ‘prostitutes’ which 
indicates an assertion that journalists are corrupt. The German PEGIDA page often uses 
caricatures showing a right-wing world views. A cartoon from September 2nd shows 
journalists in training with an instructor saying: “You are writing ‘left march’? 
Everyone who is neglecting the teaching content is fired!”. There is also an attempt to 
create some kind of a counter-public in a posting on September 2nd when PEGIDA 
linked to a live video stream in Budapest to show live pictures of refugees in the 
Hungarian capital. In that posting the movement claimed that “the #presstitutes of the 




Most cases of contesting posts concern dissent with the content of mainstream media 
articles, for example on July 22nd, August 17th, 18th or September 24th. The reference 
from July 22nd is an article to the German news magazine Focus on Islamic religious 
education in Germany. PEGIDA Austria criticizes that concept in a satirical way: 
“Seriously, with an alleged minority of 4.2 million Muslims in Germany this is 
absolutely unnecessary, or have we been lied to for decades?”. The example from 
August 18th is an interview with a social scientist published in the Austrian newspaper 
Der Standard. In the text, the researcher claims that we witness the “most qualified 
immigration ever”. PEGIDA opposes the statement and proposes a policy which takes 
care that people do not have to flee to Europe if their home countries would be more 
livable. A third example is a graphic of the Austrian Television which shows a quote of 
the chairwomen of the Green Party in Austria, Eva Glawischnig, who said that she 












chairwomen of the Greens Eva Glawischnig integrates the burka into Austria. Or 
Austria into the burka. Only she knows precisely!”. There is also direct criticism of 
specific media outlets. On September 4th a link to a TV interview aired on Austrian 
Television (ORF) was commented by PEGIDA: “The ORF did not expect that a Middle 
East expert gives answers to mass migration to Europe which the red broadcasting (in 
German the term “Rotfunk” indicates a left-leaning medium) has not expected!”.  
Besides contesting references, we also find postings showing an overall claim 
against mainstream media. These are postings which are not necessarily naming specific 
media institutions but which are displaying media criticism in general. Negative 
references of that type are sometimes made by posting wall charts claiming that media 
is an “agitator” (September 24th), “hides” (September 12th) information, or manipulates 
the coverage by only showing “dead children or women” (September 5th) as refugee 
victims. Some cases indicate that the Austrian producers try to build up the classical 
populist triad (Jagers and Walgrave 2007, p. 323) of ‘the people’ against ‘the elites’, 
consisting of politicians and the media, and against ‘social outside groups’ which are 
supposed as a threat to the ‘heartland’ (Mudde 2004, p. 543), mainly Muslim migrants 
(August 17th, 28th and September 10th). An example from September 24th summarizes 
all three social groups of populist discourse in a wall chart: “Big thanks to everybody 
who has the courage to speak about problems in our asylum policy. Thank you for 
resisting the agitation of the media, celebrities, the lefts, the greens and other do-
gooders. Keep it up! You are not alone!”. Like in the German sample, there are also 
allegations of an influence of the government on public broadcasting, for instance on 
August 22nd: The page links to an article of a right-wing alternative website blaming 
the Austrian Television not to reveal the origin of a band of robbers in Vienna. Another 
post from September 10th blames the ORF to be an institution of “state propaganda” 
and calls the public service broadcaster “state broadcaster” (in German: “Staatsfunk” in 




The contesting references on the Swedish PEGIDA page were rare. The examples we 
found mostly contained indirect contesting references where articles from immigration 
critical alternative media were cited and where mainstream media is criticized. One 
example is a link to a video from the American alternative site Clashdaily.com, telling 
the story of a young girl who was raped by Muslim immigrants. The highlighted 
preamble states: “This is exactly what the media does not want you to know.”. Another 
posting consisted of a link to an article at Pamelageller.com with the title: “Media 
BLACKOUT on MASSIVE PROTEST Against Muslim Migrant Invasion of Europe.”. 














The contesting references to mainstream media found on the Norwegian page were 
either arguments against statements and opinions presented in newspapers or contained 
critical remarks about the media per se. One post dealt with the fact that the PEGIDA 
movement is widely described as right-wing extremist in the mainstream media and 
countered by referring to humanist values. Another posting linked to an article in the 
daily newspaper Dagbladet.no with the title “A good investment for Norway” - pointing 
to immigration as an investment to counter the demographic trend of a decreasing 
population in Norway. PEGIDA Norway comments: “Is this irony?”, and present 
statistics for the employment rate for immigrants from several Muslim countries. 
Another type of contesting reference deals with how the media work. In relation to an 
attempted rape case, where the suspects were described as North Africans in 
mainstream media, a debate followed about whether or not to disclose such information. 
PEGIDA Norway exclaims: “Enrichment! Attempted rape! Multiculture!”, blaming 
Norwegian politicians and media paving the way for such behavior by being overly 





Overall, we identified two strategic patterns of PEGIDA’s online communication: 
Firstly, affirmative references (references used in an affirmative way, as proof of own 
positions or support for stated opinions). Against our first working hypothesis, there 
were not only contesting references to established media which would have confirmed 
theories of populism assuming that populists are dependent on the antipode against elite 
institutions like media organizations (Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). 
Secondly, we found contesting references criticizing mainstream media. Contesting 
references can be separated into two sub patterns: The first type comprises of ‘liar 
press’ allegations in general. As the qualitative analysis shows, criticism of ‘the liar 
press’, ‘the state media’ or ‘the red broadcast’ reveal a deep-rooted skepticism visible 
on the PEGIDA Facebook pages in all four countries. The second sub pattern contains 
opposing opinions to media information, for instance disagreement with statements of 
public figures speaking in the media. In this respect, Germany, Austria, and Norway 
follow a similar pattern, where comments accompany links to articles containing 
statements in mainstream media, while the Swedish page more passively posts links to 
content in other media. 
The occurrence of affirmative references to mainstream media shows the 
complexity of populist communication as well as its relationship to established media 
organizations. On the one hand, an alternative media sphere was established in the last 
years with a high reach in some instances. If we look at Germany we see a wide range 
of right-wing alternative media projects like Politically Incorrect (PI News), Compact 












of their wide reach, rather successful in the right-wing sector. In addition to that, the 
publishers mentioned above offer a broad spectrum of content, for example: articles, 
videos, books, or conferences. Consequently, Storz (2015, 7) believes there is 
“communicative full service” in the right-wing public sphere. Despite of the emergence 
of right-wing media, our findings show that populist communication depends on the 
supply of information by established media houses since right-wing alternative media 
do not have the financial and personnel resources for ‘real’ journalistic work. Besides, 
the use of mainstream media content may lead to a higher credibility among the public.  
 
Restrictions of the study 
 
This paper presented an exploratory study to discover possible relationships between 
populist social movements and established media. Therefore, a qualitative approach was 
used in order to focus on the content and the language of the PEGIDA postings. We 
tried to present our methodology and findings as transparent as possible. However, there 
are some restrictions of the study which have to be considered in the valuation of the 
findings. As in other online content analysis, we cannot guarantee that the content was 
not modified since we saved the material on a fixed date. Almost all online content is 
characterized by a high transitoriness and dynamicity. There is also a problem 
concerning the multimediality and multimodality of online content (Wünsch and 
Welker 2010, 497): Facebook posts do not only contain texts but also videos, images 
and other visual material such as emoticons, visual memes or gifs. Though we also tried 
to include ironic and sarcastic visual statements, our study mainly focused on the textual 
part of the material.  
Furthermore, the methodological design of the study was based on theoretical 
assumptions of the relationship between populism and the media. After a first analysis, 
we decided to use a qualitative content analysis to determine main categories of populist 
references to mainstream media actors. Hence, the presented study must be seen as a 
preliminary study for a quantitative content analysis. Due to limited personnel resources 
the paper is limited to the Scandinavian, German and Austrian case studies. Hence, the 
study cannot claim to be applicable for other countries as well as for other types of 
populist web presences. Nevertheless, our theoretical classification is useful and can be 
used in further research projects on populist online communication. 
 
 
Concluding remarks and outlook 
 
This paper tries to answer the question of how right-wing populist movements relate to 
and criticize established media. We therefore analyzed the Facebook communication of 












stated above, there is an alternative media sphere being established in the populist 
sector. In the European case, these communicative services are not as powerful as 
mainstream media. However, we witness a higher recognition of political alternative 
media in the US. After the inauguration of President Donald Trump, some right-wing 
media received press credentials for the White House, for example the Gateway Pundit 
blog (Grynbaum 2017). Apart from smaller alternative media organizations, Breitbart 
News Network became one of the leading news sites for conservatives in the US. The 
use, spread and impact of such alternative media will be a major issue for media 
scholars and political scientists to study in the near future.   
Further research should continue to analyze the relationship of populist 
alternative media and mainstream media to observe possible changes in the dependence 
of alternative media on content of established journalism. Furthermore, general and 
ongoing studies on the field positions of alternative media actors could be useful to 
identify powerful players in the alternative media field. A field-centered approach could 
be a reasonable basis to determine the power positions which arise from inequitable 
allocations of cultural, social, and economic capital (Bourdieu 1992, 58). Influential 
populist media outlets like Breitbart in the US, Avpixlat and Fria Tider in Sweden or 
Kopp in Germany could be ranked higher in the alternative media field whereas smaller 
blogs or individual websites are less powerful. An ongoing measurement of that field 
could give scholars the possibility to make predictions for the future communicative 
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